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SUMMARY:
... I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSERVATIVE PRAGMATIC MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS,
OR, TEMPERING NGO EXTREMISM ... I worry, however, that the twin attack I have
just made on progressive international NGOs for their desire to manipulate the
American polity toward ends that they could not achieve through the US
democratic process, on the one hand, and on the failure of American free trade
legislation to meet minimum moral and political standards of democratic process,
on the other hand, will be seen as trying to have it all--a pox on all parties
and the kind of "balanced" approach to liberal internationalists and
conservative democratic sovereigntists that is favored in the media. ...
However, since international NGOs consist of mere humans who, like anybody else,
are unlikely to be able to resist the lure of prestige, power, and access to
power, and, further, since many international NGOs are hostile to the very idea
of democracy if its results might conflict with their desired results--well,
then it is the responsibility of the Bush administration, in the conduct of its
foreign policy, to resist for them. ...
TEXT:
[*371] I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONSERVATIVE PRAGMATIC MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL
NGOS, OR, TEMPERING NGO EXTREMISM
The attitude of the Bush administration with respect to the vast array of
international nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") that now populate the
international scene is, of course, in a process of development. Yet while the
Bush administration has identified international issues that raise serious
questions of American sovereignty, it does not appear to have understood the
importance of international NGOs as international actors carrying forward these
issues with one political agenda or another--not merely as followers or
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supporters, but as the driving force with respect to many important questions.
The overtly realist orientation of the Bush foreign policy team (at least as it
exists at this point, being under considerable pressure to moderate itself) may
unfortunately be fundamentally, indeed dangerously, ill-suited to understand
that in today's world, in matters from human rights to the environment to
population policy to adventures in humanitarian intervention, the leadership and
driving force behind policy often comes from international NGOs.
This is true notwithstanding that international NGOs do not apparently have
the traditional realist indicia of political power. Realism has a tendency to
ignore actors whose influence derives from their single-minded attention to
ideology rather than from more obvious material factors, preferring to ask, in
the classic exchange, "How many legions has the Pope?" even when it is evident
that in the democratic world, image and ideas and political fashion matter a
great deal in establishing policy. [*372] In that arena, international NGOs do
not need legions of their own, if by effective lobbying and the deployment of
CNN, they can have NATO's.
To be sure, there are important appointees in the Bush administration that do
understand the importance of international NGOs in setting the agendas of
international affairs--John Bolton is chief among them. Still, the Bush
administration does not appear fundamentally to understand that a long-term,
indispensable, though easily ignored, goal of Bush foreign policy ought to be to
strengthen the sovereignty of democratic states, including American democratic
sovereignty. That unapologetically ideological goal can be accomplished only by
redefining the relationship between democratic sovereign states and the
combination of international NGOs and international organizations. The Bush
administration ought to see redefining those relationships--and the articulation
of an ideal and ideology of international affairs as the realm of democratic
sovereigns, rather than the realm of nascent international organizations
benevolently guided by international NGOs--as a major contribution to the
strength of democracy in the world today. Yet it must also understand that to do
so flies in the face of all that is considered fashionable, hip, progressive,
and ordained by history among the international elites. These elites, in thrall
to the idea of globalization, form the cohort not merely of international NGOs
and international organizations, but also of much of the US foreign policy
establishment and, likewise, multinational business. Lack of hipness is today
the price of fidelity to American democratic institutions.
Several different tendencies of thought about international NGOs can be
discerned among American conservatives, some of which are consistent with each
other and others of which are not. There are, to start with, strong
conservatives, often religiously affiliated, bearing long hostility toward the
sizable mass of international NGOs associated with "liberal" or "progressive"
causes. These conservatives often define their attitudes around such "values"
issues as population planning and abortion, and the kinds of cultural issues
attached to such treaties as the Convention on the Rights of the Child n1 and
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), n2 which, largely due to pressure from these conservative
constituencies, have never been accepted by the United States. There are other
strong conservatives whose ire toward international NGOs is less attached to
issues of values and culture, but for whom the defining issues tend to be
environmental regulation, global warming, and the Kyoto Protocol n3 on
greenhouse gas [*373] emissions in particular. Sometimes these conservatives
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are attached to business interests and sometimes not, but concern about economic
growth and the cost of international regulation figures prominently for them.
There are still other conservatives whose antipathy toward international NGOs is
attached not to a particular set of issues, but is instead generated by a more
abstract sense that international NGOs, on a wide range of matters, tend to
strengthen international organizations at the expense of American political
institutions. For them the issue is sovereignty and the distressing possibility
of its erosion--one example is their opposition to the International Criminal
Court on the grounds that it represents the strengthening of international
governance at the expense of American institutions.
Common to all conservatives who share this hostility towards international
NGOs is a concern, eloquently pointed out by such writers as Jeremy Rabkin, n4
Jack Goldsmith, n5 John Yoo, n6 and John Bolton, n7 that international NGOs
understand international law to be a means (often social engineering of a
liberal character) by which to achieve results that have been rejected by
national democratic political processes. In other words, international law and
international agreements are seen as a means of doing an end-run around domestic
democratic processes. And in the case of the United States, lurking beneath all
of these concerns is a sense that the treaty power cannot be used
constitutionally to rewrite the domestic political order. In the case of any of
these tendencies, of course, the hostility is toward a particular kind of
international NGO, broadly speaking, the left-wing, liberal, or progressive
do-gooding organization. (After all, the most conservative Christian churches in
the United States have historically not infrequently been committed toward
activist work abroad. Many of these religious organizations, on some politically
neutral definition of "international NGO," would have to count as some of the
most successful long-term international NGOs.) The hostility exhibited by many
American conservatives is not merely directed toward liberal or progressive
do-gooding organizations as such; it achieves a special vehemence on account of
the cultural shift within the collective imagination of leftists, liberals, and
progressives which today unblinkingly declares that progress must equal
universality, which in turn must equal internationalism. n8
[*374] The first of those equalities, progress must equal universality, is
at least debatable, as generations of relativists and postmodernists have
argued. The second, however, that universality must equal the international, is
at best unsupported. After all, one need not be a moral relativist--I, for
example, am no relativist--to think it an open question who is fit to declare
what is genuinely universal. Even universalists have to be willing to answer
that question, if only by implication, and it is far from self-evident that
genuinely universal principles are somehow best discovered and enunciated by
international organizations, international NGOs, or anything else at the
international level. Why shouldn't the true universals be discovered and
enunciated by political organizations far closer to the ground, where people
actually live--democratic sovereign states, for example? There is nothing
conceptually or practically obvious about believing that the international ought
to have the conclusive word on the universal.
Nevertheless, it is sacred doctrine that the international uniquely
incarnates the universal; thus, the international must be supported over the
parochially national no matter what. It is this cultural shift--the movement
from liberal internationalism as a distant dream of utopian crazies to the
central ideology of progressivism--that gives, in my experience at international
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law conferences, debates over the status of international NGOs a curiously
surreal air. The world views of the democratic sovereigntists and the liberal
internationalists have moved radically apart--although, in my experience
democratic sovereigntists seem better able at least to conceptualize the world
as imagined by liberal internationalists than the other way around. Perhaps the
asymmetry lies in the hubris of progress as ideology. In my experience,
progressivism often has grave difficulties in seeing its opponents' intellectual
stance as other than atavistic and benighted. Suffice it to say that it has made
debate difficult, and I welcome particularly those who strongly disagree with
me, but are willing to debate these matters, because it shows that discussion of
these important disagreements is not dead.
For all of the conservative hostility toward international NGOs,
international organizations, and international law, however, there are also
powerful, even dominant tendencies within the Republican Party and the Bush
administration that broadly accept the presence of international NGOs as a part
of international life, whether as lobbyists for one view or another, as
deliverers of humanitarian relief, as experts in some field, or as organizations
with whom practical minded, hardnosed American realists will frequently do
business. Let me sketch out an approximation of this conservative realist
thinking. Whatever one thinks of such international circuses as the Cairo
population conference, the Rio conference on the environment, or the Beijing
conference on women, the international aid industry is here to stay, the human
rights organizations are here to stay, the environmental organizations are here
to stay, and so on. Although, on this view, one may have to fight with NGOs on
some fronts, and take a lot of bad press from their friends and allies in the
international media, in the end the task is to find common ground to do business
with them where possible. It [*375] might even be seen as an essential tenet
of committed conservative internationalism, one of those criteria that
differentiates conservative isolationists from conservative internationalists.
And within the Bush ideology of compassionate conservatism, nothing might seem
more natural than to want to cooperate as much as possible with international
NGOs. After all, the Bush administration sees volunteer organizations as the key
to improving social service delivery in America; why should it be any different
abroad? Surely volunteer organizations can do a more efficient job of many
things than international organizations can, so why not work with them where
possible? It's not as if there is a long list of parties able to deliver medical
aid in Chechnya, or run refugee camps in Congo, or vaccinate children in
southern Sudan. Whatever the rest of their political agendas, international NGOs
are often not only the best positioned to do these jobs, they are the only
organizations with any possibility of doing them. And however annoying to
American conservatives the sniping from organizations such as Human Rights Watch
n9 or Amnesty International n10 on things like the death penalty in America,
there is considerable common ground with them on a variety of situations
worldwide. In any case, their reporting is an important source of information.
Even the environmental organizations--perhaps the most annoying of all to
American conservatives--have a point: not even conservatives, one should like to
hope, want to see the whales become extinct. Greenpeace, perhaps; the whales,
no.
Thus, alongside the deep antipathy of some conservatives toward international
NGOs, there is also a natural tendency in the Bush administration to want to
find ways to work with international NGOs: to use them as providers of services,
to take advantage of their expertise and networks, to find common ground with
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them in pressuring recalcitrant countries on issues such as human rights and
sometimes even the environment, and to obtain their support for administration
policies where possible. This tendency toward pragmatic dealings--more
hardheaded and willing to offend than the Clinton administration, more assertive
of US interests than the Albright tenure, but also pragmatically accepting of a
role for international NGOs as legitimate actors in realms of international
action and policy--will be referred to here for convenience as the "pragmatic
conservative" model for dealing with international NGOs. As a model of behavior
toward international NGOs by the Bush administration, the pragmatic conservative
model rests, it seems to me, on three fundamental assumptions.
First, however much certain parts of the conservative base reject on
principle international NGOs as "partners" with the US government in one matter
or another, [*376] international NGOs are independently "legitimate" in some
sense. They are a part of the constellation of actors with which the United
States must interact; moreover, they frequently are not just important but
positive players within international affairs. Not only are they not going to go
away, but they are at least to some extent "legitimate" actors with whom the
United States not only must, but should, do business.
Second, the proper way to think about international NGOs--the measure and
meaning of their legitimacy, so to speak--is the same way that the Bush
administration thinks of volunteer organizations within US domestic society.
Volunteer organizations, or domestic NGOs, are frequently powerful irritants,
sometimes powerful opponents, but oftentimes they provide the crucial margin of
support for policy. Even more fundamentally, private voluntary organizations
make America the place it is. They are "civil society," the glory of private
life in a democratic country, and the task for the Bush administration is to
galvanize them into even greater action through such things as revisions to the
tax code on charitable donations and through the "faith-based initiatives." And
if that is how private voluntary organizations ought to be seen within the
United States, then they should be seen the same way, indeed even more so,
abroad where the needs for both their contributions and the special benefits of
voluntary organizations and civil society are so strikingly evident.
International NGOs can thus be seen, within one plausible Bush administration
view of the world, as the international equivalent of domestic civil society. In
the long run, the development of institutions of civil society is a good
thing--even if sometimes they can be a short term, vocal annoyance--because they
are a sign of a developing and maturing democracy.
Third, if international NGOs--even ones the administration does not like--are
legitimate political actors in the sense of being the sometimes noisy, sometimes
rude, sometimes crazy equivalent of domestic civil society, then the pragmatic
conservative model for dealing with them essentially ought to be to contain
their wilder impulses while continuing to work with them where and as one can.
The task of the pragmatic conservative model for dealing with international NGOs
is not to oppose them as a category fundamentally (because they are regarded as
legitimate domestic pressure groups and NGOs in America), but instead to temper
their extreme impulses and encourage them toward sensible actions and advocacy
positions. There will always be outliers, organizations with which the US
government cannot deal, just as there are within American society. However, an
important aspect of American foreign policy must be to engage these new forces
of international civil society because, after all, they are a force for bringing
into the world of international action the same kinds of vital energies directed

Page 6
2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 371, *376

towards voluntary action that are crucial to American democracy. A possible
tendency of the Bush administration will be to temper the extremes of
international NGOs while basically accepting their view of themselves as a
nascent international civil society that is a crucial part of the
democratization of the world.
This all sounds plausible initially. I nonetheless urge that the pragmatic
conservative view of international NGOs is deeply, fundamentally flawed. [*377]
Furthermore, the Bush administration does damage in the short-term to itself and
damage in the long-term to the ideal of democracy (and American democracy in
particular) by subscribing intellectually or practically to this view. At the
same time, adopting a more accurate view of international NGOs is not simply a
recipe for what a more strident conservatism might desire. If, as I suggest, one
indispensable element of any approach to international affairs ought to be its
impact upon American democratic processes, then the processes by which certain
matters dear to the heart of conservatism--free trade especially--can barely be
described as fulfilling the letter, let alone the spirit, of democratic
sovereignty. What is required instead is a view of international affairs,
international organizations, international NGOs, international law, and US
constitutional law (and the treaty power in particular) that respects and
strengthens American democratic processes, without which a specifically American
sovereignty could not exist.
II. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PRAGMATIC CONSERVATIVE MODEL AND AN ALTERNATIVE
UNDERSTANDING OF INTERNATIONAL NGOS, OR, THE RISKS TO DEMOCRACY WHEN
INTERNATIONAL NGOS PROPOSE THEMSELVES AS SUBSTITUTES FOR DEMOCRACY
The fundamental flaw in the pragmatic conservative view of international NGOs
is its unthinking acceptance of the idea that international NGOs somehow are the
genuine equivalent of domestic NGOs in a democratic society, that international
NGOs really are the international equivalent of domestic civil society, and that
international NGOs are, as they increasingly call themselves, "international
civil society." n11 The names and labels matter. Ideology matters.
International NGOs have obtained a very sizable grant of legitimacy from
governments and international organizations over the last ten or fifteen years
simply by asserting on their own behalf the view that they are not merely
private organizations, but that they are, in virtue of being private voluntary
organizations, "international civil society" in all the glorious and
expansionary meaning that the term acquires through shades of de Tocqueville and
Adam Smith. It is not by accident that international NGOs stress their
legitimacy as international actors by invoking the lofty claim that they are
civil society rather than by stressing, as in an earlier time, their good works
and service on behalf of the world's poor and oppressed.
But what is the difference in the claim? Why is it different and more
politically reaching to claim the mantle of civil society rather than merely
resting, for example, on the laurels of one's service to fellow human beings?
The inflation of legitimacy lies, it seems to me, in the implied claim of
representativeness. When, for example, Jody [*378] Williams, recipient of the
1997 Nobel Prize on the behalf of the NGO campaign to ban landmines, speaks of
international NGOs, she speaks of them as representatives of the peoples of the
world. n12 The international NGOs, on this view, represent the peoples of the
planet in negotiations and discussions with international organizations, with
governments, and with multinational corporations. As such they should be
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understood as a force for democratizing international affairs and the so-called
"international community." I cannot stress enough how widespread is the sense of
entitlement that international NGOs feel as a result of simply conceiving of
themselves in this way, even when many of those institutions are, at best,
nascent. It is a sense of political entitlement that practically requires, in
the name of democratic legitimacy, that international NGOs be treated not merely
as lobbyists in the corridors, but as official negotiators on behalf of "civil
society" and the world's "peoples" in treaty negotiations. Combined with the
nearly complete capture by international NGOs of the foreign policy agendas of a
number of smaller Western democracies--Canada particularly comes to mind--it is
a stunning witness to the power of ideology. It is also a phenomenon that the
currently articulated pragmatic conservatism of the Bush foreign policy team
seems ill-equipped to recognize, let alone reform, because the premises of its
power are not fundamentally material, but those of image, idea, and perception.
The Bush administration is (perhaps) capable of rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and
of taking the heat for that rejection from its sovereign allies. It does not
appear to have, however, grasped the concept that the international NGOs, as
much as any sovereign actor, brought the Protocol into being and certainly were
as responsible as any sovereign actor for its contents. Nor does the Bush
administration yet appear to have any idea how to assess and disentangle the
myriad issues with which many of its allies have intertwined their sovereign
foreign policymaking and diplomacy with international NGOs.
Whether pragmatic conservatism is capable of conceptualizing international
NGOs as a phenomenon that must be addressed in its own right, rather than simply
addressing particular issues raised by the treaties, agreements, and policies
that international NGOs are able to establish across many different subject
areas, American conservatives have come to understand the mechanisms by which
international NGOs insert themselves into policy processes. Particularly
following the Seattle World Trade Organization ("WTO") debacle, even parts of
the traditional liberal foreign policy establishment have begun asking on what
basis in theory or in fact international NGOs should be taken as "representing"
the peoples of the world. The Economist, for example, a magazine that for most
of the decade has styled itself as [*379] the voice of enlightened global
capitalism finding common ground with globalizing NGOs, practically convulsed in
the months following Seattle with articles and leaders attacking international
NGO representativeness and accountability. n13 Inevitably, the attacks
descended into a manichean division of the world into the "good" NGOs--such as
the human rights NGOs who might raise tough questions but do not fundamentally
threaten the terms of global capitalism, and indeed find it a useful lever by
which to enter new markets (in the manner, that is, of priests accompanying the
conquistadores)--on the one hand, and the "bad" NGOs--especially the radical
environmentalists, some of whom actually believe their rhetoric about
localism--on the other. There is a long way to go in dismantling that claim to
representativeness, but at least some of those questions are being put to the
international NGOs. And to some degree, the international NGOs have felt
themselves on the defensive with respect to the fundamental question that David
Rieff asked in a rather lonely fashion for a long time--"So who elected the
NGOs?" n14 It is no longer considered, even among doctrinally pure liberal
internationalists, a wholly heretical question.
What is less understood, but frankly more important, is the symbiosis between
international NGOs and international organizations. It is a process of mutual
legitimation in which international organizations treat international NGOs with
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all the legitimacy and deference that domestic democratic governments must treat
their domestic voters. In turn the international NGOs treat international
organizations, even if not precisely the organizations they would like to see
now, as the legitimate source of governance on the planet--governance which
needs to be reworked and reformed by paying close attention to the NGO agenda,
but which is, simply because it is "international," morally and politically
preferable to merely sovereign national governments (which, after all, often do
not give international NGOs the policies they seek). n15 In the wake of the
attacks at Seattle on the WTO, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), and the
World Bank, this relationship of mutual legitimation--really a passionate
romance between international organizations and international NGOs--may be hard
to accept. But notwithstanding the attacks on international [*380]
organizations, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, for example, hosted discussions
and meetings at every opportunity with international NGOs of every variety,
explicitly on the basis that international NGOs are the representatives of the
people of the planet. They are that to which international organizations must
regard themselves as accountable because they are the voice of the people in
some way that merely sovereign governments, even democratic ones, apparently can
never be. Likewise James Wolfensohn, president of the World Bank, never makes a
policy move without lengthy consultation and input from international NGOs, so
much so that many observers have noted that World Bank policy in certain areas
is essentially set by the international NGOs. n16 It would not be overstating
matters to say that in wide swathes of subject matters, international
organizations simply act as bureaucratic clearing houses and organizational
facilitators for international NGOs. The two then act together, along with a
core of smaller Western states sympathetic to the idea of reducing the power of
the large sovereign states--and the United States in particular--to bring along
the rest of the world's sovereign states. It is a pattern that has been repeated
on a wide range of issues from environmental regulation to women's rights.
Attempting to deal with this process on an issue-by-issue or subject
matter-by-subject matter basis simply misses the point that it is the
infrastructure of the relationship between international organizations and
international NGOs.
The IMF and WTO have been slower to come around to the understanding that
they owe accountability as much or more to international NGOs, but there is
little doubt that over time they will, and for a very simple reason. Every
international organization lacks moral and political legitimacy in the only way
that matters in the modern world if one's brief is not merely to advise, cajole,
jawbone, or chat, but instead to govern--which is to say, they all lack
democratic legitimacy. The UN and its agencies, the World Bank, the WTO, the
IMF--none can lay any claim to democratic legitimacy except through the
attenuated mechanism of the democratic legitimacy of the member democratic
sovereign states. That lack of direct democratic legitimacy did not matter much
as long as these international organizations did not purport to govern. But in
the post cold war period, the demands placed on these organizations have grown
along with their own desire to govern the actions of sovereign states. Thus, the
democratic deficit of international organizations has become the primary issue
beyond the day to day crises--in part because the day-to-day crises are not
infrequently occasioned by the lack of democratic legitimacy. Hence, the
behavior of Kofi Annan in praising international NGOs as representatives of the
world's people and spending sizable amounts of his time with NGO conferences is
very far from simply being a way to placate a group of well organized and vocal
critics. It is, much more importantly, a way of building a constituency, of
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supporting the [*381] ideological claim of that constituency to be the fount
of democratic legitimacy that international organizations otherwise so
conspicuously lack. Annan praises the international NGOs as the voice of global
democracy because he so desperately needs a source of democratic legitimacy that
he can point to. n17 Simultaneously, of course, international NGOs graciously
accept the mantle of democracy because it increases their influence enormously.
International NGOs and international organizations are locked in a powerful
romantic embrace, each giving to the other and each taking from the other, to
the detriment of true democracy. Yet somehow I doubt that the Bush
administration at this point in its dealings with Annan and the UN, for example,
or in its dealings with various NGOs, genuinely understands the importance of
this symbiosis, even though Annan plainly does. Nor does the Bush administration
understand the importance of publicly and aggressively breaking the symbiosis in
order to stop the evolution of the debate away from the control of the
democratic sovereigns, especially the United States.
It is important to be clear about the risks that the symbiosis of
international organizations and international NGOs pose. On this point, what
matters is not solely the substantive position taken but the process by which it
is taken and the process that it implies for democratic sovereign states. For
example, I think that the International Criminal Court ought to be undermined by
the United States at every real and symbolic opportunity. Among other things, it
grossly undermines the constitutional rights of members of the United States
political community, otherwise known as its citizens. Similarly, the United
States ought decisively to reject treaties such as the Convention on the Rights
of the Child and CEDAW that essentially seek to remake American culture and
values according to the desires of a strange and remote elite of international
NGOs that could never get a hearing within US domestic politics, precisely
because our politics are democratic in a way that international NGOs despise.
Yet, I imagine, unlike many at the AEI conference, I believe firmly that the
United States ought to give up its deployment of anti-personnel landmines
because they are an indiscriminate weapon. It should do so without special
regard for the fact that it has also been the subject of an intensive
international campaign and treaty, n18 but it should do so. I also think that
while the Kyoto Protocol [*382] is seriously and unacceptably flawed, evidence
of global warming is persuasive and inaction is not acceptable.
One may think one way or another on the substantive issues raised by
international NGOs; that is not the point. What is more important is whether the
solutions, if any, that one believes ought to be pursued are pursued in a
fashion that comports with democratic legitimacy. And it is on this point that
the second assumption that I attributed at the beginning of this article to
pragmatic conservatism--that international NGOs are essentially the equivalent
of civil society in a settled democratic society--collapses. International NGOs
may say that their activities of lobbying, persuasion, protest, media
manipulation, report writing, etc., are no different in the international field
than that which their equivalents perform in domestic democratic societies. This
may be true, as far as it goes. The difficulty, however, is that international
NGOs perform these activities in an entirely different political structure and
environment from domestic organizations--the difference is that one is
democratic and the other is not. In a domestic democratic society, we do not
look to nonprofit organizations as the proof of our democratic credentials--we
look to elections and the ballot for that proof. That frees NGOs to be what they
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are--protest and pressure organizations, organizations which are both the glory
of a democratic society and its by-product, but which are not the proof of it.
Citizens' associations, pressure groups, lobbying organizations, and protest
organizations are not, in a settled democratic society, accountable to any but
themselves and their own principles--nor should they be, because the function of
democratic accountability is accomplished by a wholly different mechanism:
elections.
In the undemocratic international world, however, matters are entirely
different. There are no direct elections. Rather, there is the attenuated,
indirect democratic process of sovereign democracies supposedly controlling
international organizations. But as these international organizations reach out
to seek to govern the behavior of these same sovereigns--to attenuate their
sovereignty--then they also lose the ability to rely on them as the source of
their democratic legitimacy. In the democratic deficit that inevitably develops,
it is natural, but wrong, to look to the pressure groups, the citizens' groups,
the opposition groups, and the protest organizations, as an alternate source of
democratic legitimacy. And the NGOs are only too happy to offer themselves,
giving little heed to the fact that by offering themselves as substitutes for
democracy, they make it ever more difficult to confront the naked and painful
consequences of an international system that has no democratic legitimacy. The
system has less democratic legitimacy since embarking on the path of downgrading
democratic sovereigns and upgrading the supposed legitimacy of international
NGOs. In my view, this system cannot ever become democratic simply because
democracy in any meaningful sense is incompatible with the size and number of
people on the planet. By offering themselves as substitutes for real democracy
in order to further their own influence, international NGOs muddy the waters of
the critical question of how much power ought to be assigned to a system of
international organizations that [*383] cannot ever be democratic. At the same
time, international NGOs actively seek to undermine the processes of democracy
within democratic states whenever the results of those democratic processes
produce, in the view of the international NGOs, uncongenial substantive
outcomes. It is no exaggeration to regard the international NGOs, unlike their
domestic counterparts--or unlike the international NGOs themselves when they
work within sovereign democratic systems--as not merely undemocratic, but as
profoundly antidemocratic.
III. FREE TRADE, OR, SAUCE FOR THE GOOSE
But now there is a serious problem of principle lurking here for
conservatives. If there is anything that I have tried to admire in recent years
about conservatives, it is an insistence on parity of principle--sauce for the
goose, in short. It has seemed to me that conservatives have in recent years
been much more insistent on that basic tenet of fairness than have American
liberals, for whom every principle is modified by another, often invented
specially for the occasion, in order to reach an outcome congenial to their
prejudices, culture, and class. Yet it also seems to me that conservatives face
a large problem if they agree with the primacy of democratic procedures and
adherence to these democratic procedures at the level of the sovereign state,
and, in particular, if they claim as conservatives so often and so correctly do,
that the Constitutional treaty power cannot be the basis for the wholesale
remaking of the domestic political order. It is unacceptable, whether in the
case of the reverse discrimination provisions of CEDAW, the "best interests of
the child" state empowerment--parental disempowerment standards of the Child
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Rights Convention, or the evisceration of American soldiers' US constitutional
rights in criminal matters under the ICC statute.
That said, however, it also seems to me plainly unacceptable that free trade
(including the stunning amount of rewriting of the rules of commerce, labor
standards, environmental standards, and health and safety standards that has
arisen and could arise under existing and proposed free trade agreements) should
somehow be considered exempt from the principle of democratic procedure and
limits on the treaty power, just because free trade is a sacred tenet for many
conservatives.
Please do not mistake my point here. I yield to no one in my devotion to
Ricardo and the substantive cause of free trade. Free trade should be a central
goal of American foreign policy. The North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), among many examples, has been a considerable success. It seems to me
that the Bush administration has an immediate moral obligation, irrespective of
the political cost and the irritation of the senior senator from North Carolina,
to achieve access for poor African countries to our markets. But recognition of
the efficiencies of an ever expanding common market is not a substitute for the
fact that the WTO legislation, for example, was passed in a way that--although
it might be sustained in court as meeting the minimum requirements of
legality--does not truly square with the [*384] principle of democratic
accountability. Conservatives correctly evince great hostility when such
high-handed, undemocratic social engineering is proposed to be applied in such
matters as children and the family; they should feel the same in the matter of
free trade.
Put another way, I have read a large amount of Ralph Nader's voluminous
output on free trade. And while I find myself disagreeing with just about every
substantive remark he makes about free trade, I also find myself grudgingly
agreeing with most of his criticisms about the lack of democratic legitimacy in
the way that much free trade legislation has been passed in the United States.
Can we really pretend to ourselves or others that the 14,000 or so pages of WTO
documents that passed the Congress, where it is clear that no one who took part
in the vote had actually read the language being passed, comports with the moral
requirements of democratic legitimacy? Worse, those special, streamlined
processes for passing free trade bills have as their purpose nothing more noble
than avoiding the full democratic legislative process. In other circumstances,
conservatives touchily but correctly assert this purpose against liberal
internationalists, for whom American constitutional and legislative processes
really are just an inconvenience on the way to supranational governance. Nor is
it an accident that the purpose of avoiding democratic processes in many of
these cases is to avoid having a democratic national debate over questions of
labor and environmental standards. Regardless of what one thinks of the
substantive positions, questions of labor and environmental standards are
plainly something of considerable importance to many citizens of the United
States. Think what one will of what the substantive answers to those questions
should be, American conservatives shamed themselves in skipping over the full
measure of American democratic debate in order to get the substantive answers
that they favored. In doing so, they did their bit to make the sovereign
democratic process in America that much less meaningful or worthy of defense.
Fast track legislation, which at least operates within the domestic legislative
structure in that it requires action by both houses of Congress, barely falls
within the realm of what legally and morally ought to be allowed in US

Page 12
2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 371, *384

democratic process. Given that, the imposition--either directly by treaty or
indirectly through reference to treaty processes embedded in fast track
legislation--of exterior treaty processes that purport to override domestic
processes have, in my view, no democratic moral authority or legal basis.
It is no answer to say that the process of consolidating many matters
together into a single, unreadable and unread, gigantic bill happens many times
a year in American democracy--every time that a budget bill is passed, for
example. This is not an answer if for no other reason than that those pieces of
legislation do not commit the United States to mechanisms and dispute resolution
outside its domestic compass. In other areas where conservatives have concerns
about American domestic process and sovereignty--the death penalty, for
example--they still acknowledge that there is a difference between mechanisms to
regulate or even abolish that are constitutionally valid under US law and those
that would purport to do it by [*385] imposition of international law from
abroad. It is even less of an answer to say, "well, free trade is special." Just
as liberal internationalists have a list of issues and causes that are
"special," and hence outside democratic purview and answerable only, so to
speak, to God, incarnated as one or another international NGO, some
conservatives elevate the common market above democracy. In so doing, they not
only violate principles of democracy, they also make more opaque, and hence less
democratic, the difficult debate as to the necessary tradeoffs between the size
of the ideal common market--ever larger--and the size of meaningful democracy--a
form of government that cannot simply get larger forever. The size of the ideal
common market and the ideal democracy are in all likelihood not coextensive.
Pretending that they are coextensive in the interests of expanding free trade
does a grave disservice to democracy. It also undermines the claim of
conservatives that, in attacking social engineering through treaty in other
matters, they thereby protect democracy.
I worry, however, that the twin attack I have just made on progressive
international NGOs for their desire to manipulate the American polity toward
ends that they could not achieve through the US democratic process, on the one
hand, and on the failure of American free trade legislation to meet minimum
moral and political standards of democratic process, on the other hand, will be
seen as trying to have it all--a pox on all parties and the kind of "balanced"
approach to liberal internationalists and conservative democratic sovereigntists
that is favored in the media. "Balance" is not my interest--consistency of
principle and the defense of democratic sovereignty is. The democratic
sovereigntists have the better position as against the liberal
internationalists--but they undermine it by throwing it over, in the interests
of a certain kind of conservatism, for undemocratic approaches to free trade.
IV. CONCLUSION: CULTURE MATTERS
Just as this argument is not a call for "balance" between liberal
internationalism and democratic sovereignty, it is also not a call for
international NGOs to pack up their tents and go home. Far from it. I understand
perfectly well that an international NGO might respond, "Well, it's not our
fault that the international system is not democratic; surely it would be worse
if none of us existed to pressure the system. Surely we ought to simply do what
we do, which is pressure authority of all kinds." The reply ought to be, "Yes,
of course, international NGOs should agitate and pressure--but they should not
claim to represent anyone other than themselves, either explicitly or
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implicitly." Nor ought they to do what I regard these days as the "international
NGO fudge" on legitimacy. When, for example, interviewed on the issue of their
representativeness by an occasionally skeptical media, heads of international
NGOs are wont to say, "Oh, no, we represent no one but ourselves; [*386] don't
accuse us of overstepping the bounds of our legitimacy." n19 But then they show
up the next day at treaty negotiations over one thing or another, demanding to
be admitted as negotiators or observers on the grounds that they are
representatives of "civil society," and thus representatives of the peoples of
the world. One ought not to want it both ways, attractive as the tactical
possibility is. My argument is therefore a call to international NGOs to
understand the threat that they pose to democratic legitimacy as it can and does
exist, if they take the rhetoric of international civil society seriously in
order to enhance their own prestige and influence internationally. It is a call
to understand that democratic legitimacy, such as it is, is invested in
democratic sovereign states, like it or not. It is not invested in pressure
groups whose function is, after all, to pressure. International lobbying
organizations, pressure groups, protest groups, and international NGOs of all
varieties ought to resist the blandishments of the civil society ideology as
applied to the undemocratic and undemocratizable international realm, because
the result of elevating themselves in that way is to undermine such democratic
legitimacy as does exist.
However, since international NGOs consist of mere humans who, like anybody
else, are unlikely to be able to resist the lure of prestige, power, and access
to power, and, further, since many international NGOs are hostile to the very
idea of democracy if its results might conflict with their desired
results--well, then it is the responsibility of the Bush administration, in the
conduct of its foreign policy, to resist for them. The administration could
start simply by making clear that it does not accept international NGOs as
negotiating partners in treaty making sessions. It could end its funding and
attendance at grandiose international conferences that simply subsidize
international NGO influence. It could move to end the unhealthy combination of
NGOs and US judges making foreign policy through the effectively unchecked
process of litigation under the Alien Tort Statute. It could suggest to Kofi
Annan that he might do better things with his time than simply seeking to build
his own constituency and base of power, in no small part among the international
NGOs. It could be much more careful about which international NGOs the United
States funds to do good deeds abroad, and it could be much more aware of the
advocacy efforts of those organizations. But it ought also to democratize,
within US political institutions, the process and debate over free trade,
consistently applying principles of democratic sovereignty as to the limits on
what can be done by international agreement.
This, however, is a very different agenda than simply responding to one issue
or another. What is at stake here is the common process by which international
affairs [*387] are conducted, not merely the outcome of any particular
substantive question. This kind of abstract thinking about the processing of
ideology within international policymaking is not very easy for the realist and
pragmatic paradigm to capture. Realism and pragmatic conservatism have
difficulty reaching beyond making decisions solely on the narrow merits of
individual issues--whether landmines, Kyoto, the ICC, children's rights,
etc.--to discern the dismaying pattern of how the process works, much less to
take an interest in changing it. Changing things requires an agenda of taking
fundamentally symbolic actions of a fundamentally confrontationalist nature. The
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pragmatism of the Bush administration recoils from showdowns over symbols that
do not seem to yield concrete, material, realist results. This is particularly
likely given that the administration has felt the heat over obvious non-starters
such as the Kyoto Protocol (which, after all, was rejected 97-0 by the United
States Senate and has been ratified by no significant European state). n20 But
symbolism, including symbolic confrontation, is the point. I submit that the
Bush administration will not turn out to have accomplished very much
internationally--nothing, at any rate, that could not be turned around in short
order by a subsequent administration--unless it puts reform of the culture of
policymaking in the international arena at the center of its thinking about
international affairs, starting with what even ought to be available for
discussion within international fora. The symbols matter and the symbolic
confrontations matter because culture, obviously, is about symbols.
Lest anyone think that by refusing symbolic confrontations, the underlying
issues go away, rethink the lessons of the Clinton administration. On landmines,
for example, it became rapidly impossible to conduct even a discussion with the
military about the technical possibilities of replacing anti-personnel landmines
with something else, in large part because of the symbolic importance the issue
had achieved. Within the Pentagon it became a kind of poster child, a symbol of
what international NGOs would do if they had their way on any issue; there would
be no end to their meddling because the issue was not about landmines as a
weapon per se but instead about the reach of international NGOs and
international organizations in combination over US sovereign affairs. And this
was a perfectly rational conclusion since that is what both the international
NGOs and international organizations repeatedly asserted. The Clinton
administration responded in Clintonian fashion by professing to feel the pain of
the landmines ban movement while doing nothing of any consequence. The same
pattern of "feel your pain" but do relatively little was repeated in many ways
in the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Would it not be healthier, or at
least more honest, for the Bush administration to make itself pointedly
comfortable with an assertion of unapologetic democratic sovereignty, without
making Albright-style speeches about how all of this is really in the long term
interest of the liberal [*388] internationalist order into which the US would
eventually meld itself, and then decide which positions urged by the
international NGOs it would agree with and which not?
US administrations over time might find themselves more able seriously to
debate the moral issues that international NGOs do oftentimes put forth with
great eloquence, and even to change policy, if US administrations could draw
clear, unequivocal lines based on mutually respected principles of democratic
sovereignty. In so doing, they could cease worrying constantly about the unsated
and insatiable appetites of international NGOs who want to shift power and
governance to themselves and to international organizations. But the
progressivist ideology of international NGOs and aspirations of international
organizations egged on by European states, eager to lessen American power, does
not make that a likely outcome in the forseeable future.
Yes--one may as well be clear about it--international NGOs really do believe
that they and international organizations ought to rule the world (with some
help from Ottawa and Paris). Yet the Bush administration's pragmatic
conservatism, focusing as it does on discrete, material issues and their
outcomes, does not appear to grasp how the diffuse culture of international
elites, celebrating the international as morally superior to the merely
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democratic sovereign state, can (and often does) decisively set the atmosphere,
the debate, and the outcomes of international policy to the detriment of
democracy. This happens no matter how firm the US position on any particular
international issue. The apparent result combines international NGOs, whose
hubris exceeds their accountability, with a Bush administration that cannot
understand that a series of individual actions, even sharp and controversial
ones, such as throwing over Kyoto, do not add up to a change in the atmosphere
of international affairs. Culture matters.
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